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Abstract
Network theory provides a powerful tool for the representation and analysis of complex
systems of interacting agents. Here we investigate the United States House of Represen-
tatives network of committees and subcommittees, with committees connected according to
“interlocks” or common membership. Analysis of this network reveals clearly the strong links
between different committees, as well as the intrinsic hierarchical structure within the House
as a whole. We show that network theory, combined with the analysis of roll call votes using
singular value decomposition, successfully uncovers political and organizational correlations
between committees in the House without the need to incorporate other political information.
∗To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: mason@math.gatech.edu
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Introduction
Much of the detailed work in making United States law is performed by Congressional committees
and subcommittees. This contrasts with parliamentary democracies such as Great Britain and
Canada, where a larger part of the legislative process is directly in the hands of political parties or
is conducted in sessions of the entire parliament. While the legislation drafted by committees in the
U.S. Congress is subject ultimately to roll call votes by the full House and Senate, the important
role played by committees and subcommittees makes the study of their formation and composition
vital to understanding the work of the American legislature.
Several contrasting theories of committee assignment strategies have been developed in the po-
litical science literature (mostly through qualitative studies, although there have been some quan-
titative ones as well),1–6 but there is no consensus explanation of how committee assignments are
initially determined or of how they are modified from one session of Congress to the next. A
question of particular interest is whether political parties assign committee memberships essentially
at random or if important Congressional committees can be seen using objective analysis to be
“stacked” with partisan party members.
The work presented here approaches these issues using a different set of analytical tools from
those previously employed. We use the tools of network theory, which have been successfully applied
in recent years to characterize a wide variety of complex systems.7, 8 As we show, network theory
is particularly effective at uncovering structure among committee and subcommittee assignments
without the need to incorporate any specific knowledge about committee members or their political
positions.
Although there has been only limited previous work on networks of Congressional committees,
there is a considerable body of literature on other collaboration networks, such as the boards of
directors of corporations,9–13 which occupy a position in the business world somewhat analogous
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to that occupied by committees in Congress. It has been shown that board memberships and the
networks they create play a major role in the spread of attitudes, ideas, and practices through the
corporate world, affecting political donations,10 investment strategies,14 and even the stock market
on which a company is listed.15 Studies of the structure of corporate networks have shed considerable
light on the mechanisms and pathways of information diffusion,16–18 and it seems plausible that the
structure of congressional committees would be similarly revealing.
Networks of committees
We study the U.S. House of Representatives and construct bipartite or “two-mode” networks based
on assignments of Representatives to committees and subcommittees (henceforth called just “com-
mittees” for simplicity) in the 101st–108th Houses (1989–2004). (Table 1 lists the House leadership
during this period.) These networks have two types of nodes, Representatives and committees, with
edges connecting each Representative to the committees on which they sit.
We project these two-mode committee assignment networks onto one-mode networks whose
nodes represent the committees and whose edges represent common membership or “interlocks”
between committees. Figure 1 shows a visualization of the network of committees for the 107th
House of Representatives (2001–2002), an example which we analyze in some depth.
The more common members two committees have, the stronger their connection in the network.
We quantify the strength of connection by the normalized interlock, defined as the number of
common members divided by the expected number of such common members if committees of the
same size were randomly and independently assigned from the members of the House. Committees
with as many common members as would be expected by chance have normalized interlock 1, those
with twice as many have interlock 2, those with none have interlock 0, and so forth.
Some of the connections depicted in Fig. 1 are expected and unsurprising. For instance, one
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finds that sets of subcommittees of the same larger committee share many of the same members,
thereby forming a group or clique in the network. For example, the four subcommittees of the
107th Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence each include at least half of the full 20-member
committee and at least one third of each of the other subcommittees. These tight connections
result in normalized interlocks with values in the range 14.4–23.6, which are substantially higher
than average and cause these five nodes to be drawn close together in the graph visualization,
forming the small pentagon in the middle right of Fig. 1.
We also find more surprising connections between committees. For instance, the 9-member Select
Committee on Homeland Security, formed in June 2002 during the 107th Congress in the aftermath
of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, is observed to have a strong connection to the 13-
member Rules Committee (with a normalized interlock of 7.4 from two common members), which
is the committee charged with deciding the rules and order of business under which legislation will
be considered by other committees and the full House (see thomas.loc.gov). The Homeland Security
Committee is also connected to the 7-member Legislative and Budget Process Subcommittee of
Rules by the same two common members (with normalized interlock 13.7). In the 108th Congress
(not depicted here), the Homeland Security Committee swelled to 50 members but maintained
a close association with the Rules Committee (with normalized interlock of 4.1 from 6 common
members).
Structure of the House
Connections between committees can be quantified in greater detail by applying the technique of
single linkage clustering.19 Starting with the complete set of committees for a given Congress,
committees are joined together sequentially starting with the pair with the greatest normalized in-
terlock, followed by the next greatest, and so forth. This process generates “clusters” of committees,
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which can be represented using a tree or dendrogram, such as that shown in Fig. 2 for the 107th
House. There appear to be essentially four hierarchical levels of clusters within this dendrogram:
subcommittees, committees, groups of committees, and finally the entire House.20 (There is also
some indication of a weaker fifth level of organization corresponding to groups of subcommittees
inside larger standing committees.)
Here, we are primarily interested in the third hierarchical level—the connections between com-
mittees. For example, we see near the 8 o’clock position in Fig. 2 a tightly grouped cluster that
includes the House Rules Committee and the Select Committee on Homeland Security. Because
assignments to select committees are ordinarily determined by drawing selectively from legisla-
tive bodies with overlapping jurisdiction, one might naively expect a close connection between
the Select Committee on Homeland Security and, for example, the Terrorism and Homeland Se-
curity Subcommittee of the Intelligence Select Committee, which was formed originally as a bi-
partisan “working group” and was designated on September 13, 2001 by House Speaker Dennis
Hastert [R-IL] as the lead congressional entity assigned to investigate the 9/11 terrorist attacks (see
www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/kaniewskilegislative.htm). However, the 107th Home-
land Security Committee shares only one common member (normalized interlock 2.4) with the
Intelligence Select Committee (located near the 1 o’clock position in Fig. 2) and has no interlock
with any of the four Intelligence subcommittees.
Voting patterns
A further twist can be introduced by considering how the network of interlocks between committees
is related to the political positions of their constituent Representatives. One way to characterize
political positions is to tabulate individuals’ voting records on key issues, but such a method is
subjective by nature and a method that involves less personal judgment on the observer’s part is
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preferable. Here we use a singular value decomposition (SVD)21 of voting records.22–24 Other data
mining methods can also be used (see http://www.ailab.si/aleks/Politics/).
We define an n×m voting matrix B with one row for each of the n Representatives in the House
and one column for each of the m votes taken during the session. For instance, the 107th House
had n = 444 Representatives (including mid-term replacements) and took m = 990 roll call votes.
The element Bij is +1 if Representative i voted “yea” on vote j and −1 if he or she voted “nay”.
If a Representative did not vote because of absence or abstention, the corresponding element is 0.
The SVD identifies groups of Representatives who voted in a similar fashion on many votes.
The grouping that has the largest mean-square overlap with the actual groups voting for or against
each measure is given by the leading (normalized) eigenvector u(1) of the matrix BTB, the next
largest by the second eigenvector, and so on.21, 24 If we denote by σ2k the corresponding eigenvalues
(which are provably non-negative) and by v(k) the normalized eigenvectors of BBT (which have the
same eigenvalues), then it can be shown that
Bij =
n∑
k=1
σku
(k)
i v
(k)
j , (1)
and that the matrix B(r) with elements
B
(r)
ij =
r∑
k=1
σku
(k)
i v
(k)
j , (2)
approximates the full voting matrix B, with the sum of the squares of the errors on the elements
equal to
∑n
k=r+1 σ
2
k, which vanishes in the limit r → n. Assuming the quantities σk, which are called
the singular values, are ordered such that σ1 ≥ σ2 ≥ σ3 . . ., this means that B
(r) will be an excellent
approximation to the original voting matrix if the singular values fall off sufficiently rapidly with
increasing k.
Alternatively, one can say that the kth term in the singular value decomposition (1) accounts
for a fraction σ2k/
∑n
k=1 σ
2
k of the sum of the squares of the elements of the voting matrix. For the
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107th House, we find that the leading eigenvector accounts for about 45.3% of the voting matrix,
the second eigenvector accounts for about 29.6%, and no other eigenvector accounts for more than
1.6%. Thus, to an excellent approximation, a Representative’s voting record can be characterized
by just two coordinates, measuring the extent to which they align (or do not align) with the groups
represented by the first two eigenvectors. That is,
B
(2)
ij = σ1u
(1)
i v
(1)
j + σ2u
(2)
i v
(2)
j (3)
is a good approximation to Bij . Similar results are obtained for other sessions of Congress, with
two eigenvectors giving a good approximation to the voting matrix in every case. It has been shown
previously using other methods that Congressional voting positions are well-approximated by just
two coordinates (see voteview.com), but the SVD does so in a particularly simple fashion directly
from the roll call data. In Fig. 3, we plot the two coordinates for every member of the House of
Representatives for each of the 102nd–107th Congresses.
We find that the leading eigenvector∗ corresponds closely to the acknowledged political party
affiliation of the Representatives, with Democrats (×) on the left and Republicans (◦) on the
right in the plots. We therefore call this the “partisan coordinate” and Representatives who score
highly on it—either positively or negatively—tend often to vote with members of their own party.
From the partisan coordinate, we also compute a measure of “extremism” for each Representative
as the absolute value of their partisan coordinate relative to the mean partisan score of the full
House. That is, we define the extremism ei of a Representative by ei = |pi − µ|, where pi is the
Representative’s partisan coordinate and µ is the mean of that coordinate for the entire House
(which is usually skewed slightly towards the majority party). In Table 2, we list the most and
least partisan Representatives from each party computed from the roll call of the 107th House.
∗This holds for the 101st–105th Houses. The leading and second eigenvectors switch roles in the 106th and 107th
Houses.
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We also compare our rank orderings to those obtained using an alternative method, the Optimal
Classification (OC) technique of Poole and Rosenthal23 (also applied only to the 107th House).
In contrast, the second eigenvector groups essentially all Representatives together regardless of
party affiliation and thus appears to represent voting actions in which most members of the House
either approve or disapprove of a motion simultaneously. We call this the “bipartisan coordinate,”
as Representatives who score highly on it tend often to vote with the majority of the House.
Using our SVD results, we can also calculate the positions of the votes (as opposed to the
voters) along the same two leading dimensions to quantify the nature of the issues being decided.
We show this for the 107th House in Fig. 4. One application of this analysis is a measurement of the
reproducibility of individual votes and outcomes. By reconstituting the voting matrix using only
the information contained in the two leading singular values and the corresponding eigenvectors and
subsequently summing the resulting approximated votes over all Representatives, we derive a single
score for each vote. Making a simple assignment of “pass” to those votes that have a positive score
and “fail” to all others successfully reconstructs the outcome of 984 of the 990 total votes, or about
99.4%. (Overall, 735, or about 74.2%, of the votes passed, so simply guessing that every vote passed
would be considerably less effective.) If we throw out known absences and abstentions, the analysis
still identifies 975 of the 990 results correctly. Even with the most conservative measure of this
computation’s success rate, in which we throw out abstentions and absences first and then examine
individual Representatives’ yeas/nays (approximately 92.7% of which are correctly identified by the
sign of the elements in the projection of the voting matrix), the two-dimensional reconstruction still
identifies 939, or about 94.8%, of the votes correctly. We have repeated these calculations for the
101st–106th Houses and found similar results in each case. (The remarkable accuracy of SVDs in
reconstructing votes was previously observed for the example of the U.S. Supreme Court.24)
The SVD analysis gives a simple way of classifying Representatives’ voting positions without
making subjective judgments. In Fig. 2, we have combined our clustering analyses of committees
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with the SVD results by color-coding each committee according to the mean “extremism” of its
members, so that committees populated by highly partisan members of either party appear in red
and committees containing more moderate Representatives appear in blue. Taking again the exam-
ples of Intelligence and Homeland Security, the figures immediately identify the former as moderate
and the latter as more partisan. Indeed, the Select Committee on Homeland Security has a larger
mean extremism than any of the 19 standing Committees and has the 4th largest mean extremism
among the 113 committees of the 107th House. This is perhaps not so surprising when we see that
its constituent Representatives included the House Majority Leader, Richard Armey [R-TX], and
both the Majority and Minority Whips, Tom DeLay [R-TX] and Nancy Pelosi [D-CA]. However,
this characterization of the committee was made mathematically, using no knowledge beyond the
roll call votes of the 107th House. As another example, the 107th House Rules Committee is the
2nd most extreme of the 19 standing committees (after Judiciary) and ranks 18th out of 113 com-
mittees overall. By contrast, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 107th House
has a smaller mean extremism than any of the 19 standing Committees, and Intelligence and its
four subcommittees all rank among the 10 least extreme of all 113 committees.
Conclusions
To conclude, a network theory approach coupled with an SVD analysis of roll call votes is demon-
strably useful in analyzing organizational structure in the committees of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives. We have found evidence of several levels of hierarchy within the network of committees
and—without incorporating any knowledge of political events or positions—identified some close
connections between committees, such as that between the House Rules Committee and the Select
Committee on Homeland Security in the 107th Congress, as well as correlations between commit-
tee assignments and Representatives’ political positions. Our analysis of committee interlocks and
9
voting patterns strongly suggests that committee assignments are not determined at random (i.e.,
that some committees are indeed “stacked”) and also indicates the degree of departure from ran-
domness. We have discussed here a few observations in detail, but a rich variety of other results
can be derived from similar analyses. We hope that further studies using similar techniques will
provide key insights into the structure of the House of Representatives and other political bodies.
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Congress Speaker Majority Leader Minority Leader Majority Whip Minority Whip
101st (89–90) T. S. Foley R. A. Gephardt R. H. Michel T. Coelho, W. H. Gray III D. Cheney, N. L. Gingrich
102nd (91–92) T. S. Foley R. A. Gephardt R. H. Michel W. H. Gray III, D. E. Bonior N. L. Gingrich
103rd (93–94) T. S. Foley R. A. Gephardt R. H. Michel D. E. Bonior N. L. Gingrich
104th (95–96) N. L. Gingrich R. K. Armey R. A. Gephardt T. D. DeLay D. E. Bonior
105th (97–98) N. L. Gingrich R. K. Armey R. A. Gephardt T. D. DeLay D. E. Bonior
106th (99–00) J. D. Hastert R. K. Armey R. A. Gephardt T. D. DeLay D. E. Bonior
107th (01–02) J. D. Hastert R. K. Armey R. A. Gephardt T. D. DeLay N. Pelosi
108th (03–04) J. D. Hastert T. D. DeLay N. Pelosi R. Blunt S. Hoyer
Table 1: United States House of Representatives leadership from the 101st–108th Congresses. The
Democrats held the House majority in the 101st–103rd Congresses (1989–1994), and the Republicans
held it in the 104th–108th Congresses (1995–2004).
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VETERANS’ AFFAIRS
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Figure 1: Network of committees (squares) and subcommittees (circles) in the 107th U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, with standing and select committees labeled. (Subcommittees tend to be closely tied to their
main committee and are therefore left unlabeled.) Each link between two (sub)committees is assigned a
strength equal to the normalized interlock. Thus, lines between pairs of circles or pairs of squares repre-
sent normalized degree of joint membership between (sub)committees (it is because of this normalization
that lines between squares are typically very light), and lines between squares and circles represent the
fraction of standing committee members on subcommittees. This figure is drawn using a variant of the
Kamada-Kawai spring-embedding visualization, which takes link strengths into account.25
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Figure 2: Dendrogram representing the hierarchical clustering of the committees of the 107th U.S. House
of Representatives, determined by single-linkage clustering on normalized committee interlocks. Each
committee is color-coded according to the mean “extremism” of its members (defined in the main text),
from less extreme (blue) to more extreme (red). The clusters at each level are color-coded according to
the average of their constituent committee extremism scores.
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Figure 3: Singular value decomposition (SVD) of the voting record of the House of Representatives in
the 102nd–107th U.S. Congresses. Each point represents a projection of a Representative’s votes onto
eigenvectors corresponding to the leading two singular values. The two axes are denoted “partisan” and
“bipartisan,” as described in the text. Democrats (x) appear on the left, whereas Republicans (o) are on
the right. The few independents are marked by asterisks (*).
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Votes that passed and votes that failed in the 107th House
Figure 4: SVD of the roll call of the 107th House projected onto the voting coordinates. Points represent
projections of the votes cast on a measure onto eigenvectors corresponding to the leading two singular
values. There is a clear separation between measures that passed (o) and those that did not (x). The four
corners of the plot are interpreted as follows: measures with broad bipartisan support (north) all passed;
those supported mostly by the Right (east) passed because the Republicans constituted the majority party
of the 107th House; measures supported by the Left (west) failed because of the Democratic minority; and
the (obviously) very few measures supported by almost nobody (south) also failed.
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Least Partisan Farthest Left Farthest Right
K. Lucas [R] J. D. Schakowsky [D] T. G. Tancredo [R]
C. A. Morella [R] J. P. McGovern [D] J. B. Shadegg [R]
R. M. Hall [D] H. L. Solis [D] J. Ryun [R]
R. Shows [D] L. C. Woolsey [D] B. Schaffer [R]
G. Taylor [R] J. F. Tierney [D] P. Sessions [R]
C. W. Stenholm [D] S. Farr [D] S. Johnson [R]
R. E. Cramer [D] N. Pelosi [D] B. D. Kerns [R]
V. H. Goode [R] E. J. Markey [D] P. M. Crane [R]
C. John [D] J. W. Olver [D] W. T. Akin [R]
C. C. Peterson [D] L. Roybal-Allard [D] J. D. Hayworth [R]
Table 2: SVD rank ordering of the most and least partisan Representatives in the 107th U.S. House. The
1st column gives the least partisan Representatives, as determined by an SVD of the roll call votes. The
2nd column gives the SVD rank ordering of the most partisan Representatives. They are all Democrats, so
this also gives the rank of the Representatives farthest to the Left. The 3rd column gives the rank of the
Representatives farthest to the Right. The SVD rank ordering was determined for Representatives after
mid-term replacements (432 total Congressmen) using all 990 roll calls; it classifies 92.7% of individual votes
correctly. By contrast, in Poole and Rosenthal’s Optimal Classification (OC) method,23 a rank ordering of
the Representatives in the 107th House is determined using 443 total Representatives and 749/990 roll calls
(votes with fewer than 0.5% of the votes in the minority were removed from consideration). It classifies
92.8% of the individual Representatives’ votes correctly.
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